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6 CNN war porn, ‘shock and awe’
and a set designed in Hollywood
‘The man who reads nothing at all is better educated than the man who
reads nothing but newspapers.’ — Thomas Jefferson
THE ROLE of the media in civil society is to inform and illuminate in thepublic interest, to provide the public with an informed basis upon which
they can exercise their democratic rights. Nothing changes during wartime.
The philosopher Jeremy Bentham once remarked, ‘As to the evil which
results from a censorship, it is impossible to measure it, for it is impossible to
tell where it ends.’ During the Second Gulf War the media not only had to
contend with censorship — much of which was self-imposed — but also with
information warfare.
This information war was conducted on numerous fronts and began well
before the bombs started to fall. Among the techniques used were direct attacks
on journalists (i.e. killing them), and a huge variety of intentional misinforma-
tion strategies: lies, obstruction, legal threats and intimidation, linguistic soph-
istry, staged media events, planted information, forgery, and co-intelpro type
slander/control file attacks on important commentators and war opposition
figures.
And it is impossible indeed to determine the evil that has resulted from all
this. All that can be said with certainty is that the vast majority of the general
public remain hugely uninformed, not only about what happened during the war,
but about why the war was waged in the first place and about what has happened
since. And in this respect the media has failed to perform its role. Because the
public in New Zealand, as well as in the US, UK and Australia, remain largely
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In principle the counter-propaganda role ought to have been played by the
mainstream media. TV3 promises to its viewers to always, ‘ask all the ques-
tions’, CNN promises viewers will be the ‘first to know’. Neither organisations,
however, tried very hard to ask any of the difficult questions posed by this war.
Newspaper reporters did little better with a few notable exceptions, such as
Robert Fisk of The Independent.
In New Zealand, a notable exception to the general rule was Radio New
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Zealand, which at least went to the trouble of interviewing foreign commenta-
tors directly, rather than picking up pre-packaged content. Also worthy of a
bouquet was the New Zealand Listener’s editor, Finlay Macdonald and writer
Gordon Campbell in particular.
On a more positive note, we observed the emergence of a remarkably
effective new media force — the independent internet media — of which Scoop
is a part. The internet medium is populated by an army of independent writers,
editors and reporters. While they are working completely without formal co-
ordination, and mostly without payment, they have done an absolutely remark-
able job of providing timely and potent counter-propaganda, and continue to do
so.
In Scoop’s experience, within hours of any significant piece of misinforma-
tion appearing, a well researched and referenced column appeared to counter
and challenge the orthodox view.
The war before the war
In February 2002, The New York Times reported that the US Defense Depart-
ment had established an organisation called the Office of Strategic Influence
(OSI) shortly after the attacks of 11 September 2001. Among the methodologies
that the OSI said it would use was ‘planting of false stories in foreign media’ in
order to manage perceptions of the War on Terror. In late February, the OSI was
formally dissolved under the orders of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
However, the formal existence of an organisation committed to lying to the
public is arguably not necessary for lies to be told, and the role that we now know
the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans played in the war seems to have been
remarkably similar to that intended for the OSI.
White House Chief-of-Staff Andrew Card formally introduced the count-
down to war in the first week of September 2002. ‘From a marketing point of
view, you don’t introduce new products in August,’ he told The New York Times.
And thus began the war against Iraq.  This war reached its nadir on 15 February
2003 when an estimated 11-15 million people marched against the planned war
in Iraq in close to 1000 cities — the biggest demonstration in human history.
At a lead-up demonstration on January 18, though nearly one million
marched around the world and more than 200,000 in Washington DC, the
Associated Press estimated the DC crowd at just 30,000. During an earlier, also
impressively large, October 26 march in Washington, with at least 100,000 in
attendance, NPR’s Nancy Marshall remarked: ‘It was not as large as the
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organisers of the protest had predicted. They had said there would be 100,000
people here. I’d say there are fewer than 10,000.’ Later, under protest, both NPR
and The New York Times — two alleged bastions of liberal left-leaning media
in the US — were forced to correct their reports.
In the war against the war on Iraq the White House chose a blunt approach.
Repeat a single simple idea often enough, and you will drum it into the minds
of your audience, even if it is completely untrue. By the time war broke out
nearly 50 per cent of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein was involved in
9/11. Even more considered that they were under threat of an imminent terrorist
nuclear strike.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s war spin was a great deal more
sophisticated. At Downing St message discipline focused around a series of
dossiers. The first of these dossiers was based largely on a plagiarised under-
graduate thesis. The second based one of its most significant conclusions — that
Iraq was lying about its attempts to purchase uranium from Niger — on a set of
forgeries. Importantly, both these facts were known before the war began but
given no emphasis by the mainstream media outlets.
The war itself
At 1pm on March 18 NZT (March 17 primetime in the US) Bush delivered his
48 hour ultimatum to Saddam: Get out or face an invasion.  But even in this final
phase of the countdown, George was still being disingenuous. Ari Fleischer
explained the real position the following day: ‘The President also made plain to
the American people that if Saddam were to leave, the American forces,
coalition forces would still enter Iraq’.
Bush’s ‘get out of town’ ultimatum came from the same lexicon that
produced Shock and Awe, and the Most Wanted deck of playing cards. The
media strategy in the war proper was to turn the war into something the audience
— Andrew Card’s market who need to be sold the war — were familiar with,
pure Hollywood drama.
So Sheriff Bush issued his ultimatum to the villain of the peace, and set the
tone of what was to come. A war made for the small screen, minutely stage
managed, and in which every shot was approved by the Pentagon’s script
editors.
‘CNN war-porn’ set the tone for what followed. Reports in newspapers
evoked a sense of moment with purple and gushing patriotic prose, satellite
crossovers on live TV superficially took the viewer to war, albeit with no actual
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information about what was going on. The media played the role they were
asked to play – cheerleaders. They asked few questions and received no
answers.
Instead, we watched grainy pictures of tanks streaming across the desert, the
Seventh Cavalry — a name evoking Injun hunting parties of yore. We read
reports about scuds that were not actually scuds. We heard numerous reports
about the taking of Um Qasr, the discovery of WMDs and the surrounding of
Basra, nearly all of which turned out to be false.
We waited patiently for the top billing act, Shock and Awe.  And we got used
to briefings from generals delivered at a press center off a set designed in
SCOTT RITTER — A CO-INTELPRO PRO HIT?
SCOTT RITTER is a former UNSCOM Chief Arms Inspector. He is (or was)
the leading anti-war arms expert on the US network TV circuit. His documen-
tary, In Shifting Sands, is a compelling indictment of US policy. Just before
the war began, a relatively obscure New York newspaper reported that he may
have been arrested, in June 2001, as the result of an internet sex sting, in which
an undercover cop posing as a 16-year-old girl lured him into ‘sex chat’over
the internet. That is, as hundreds of thousands protested in the streets, this
staunch Republican and solid family man who became one of the War Party’s
most formidable enemies was suddenly ‘exposed’ — using supposedly sealed
court records — as an ‘alleged’ child molester. He disappeared from TV
screens immediately.
THE STATUE TOPPLING — PURE THEATRE?
THE ‘defining moment’, the ‘tipping point’ in the war. Network television in
the US lingered live at the scene for two hours waiting breathlessly for the
triumphant moment. The following day it was heralded all around the world
with huge front page photos showing an American flag from the 9/11 rubble
placed over Saddam’s nose. Banner headlines proclaimed the fall of Saddam
and Baghdad. The event was reported everywhere as if it was a spontaneous
crowd reaction, and that the marines involved in the toppling had just helped
out the crowd. Donald Rumsfeld likened it to the fall of the Berlin Wall.  John
Three information warfare technique examples
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Hollywood. The generals’ answers were always the same: ‘The US is doing its
absolute best to avoid civilian casualties. ..  No I can not confirm any reports of
any actual bombing mistakes... No I cannot confirm any reports of Iraqi
resistance or casualties.’ Suspicions of Iraqi malpractice were hinted at when-
ever anything bad happened. WMDs were discovered in every barn.  Later, by
the time reporters emerged with pieces of identifiable wreckage and photo-
graphs confirming US Air Force involvement in the killing of civilians, or that
the suspected WMDs were actually just insect repellant, the attention of the
media had moved on to the next explosion.
Some aspects of the media’s failures were understandable. It paid in spades
Lee Anderson in the New Yorker described it thus: ‘By the time we got back
to the hotel, the marines had arrived. A man who was standing in a crowd
gathered at the side of the road called out to ask us if we were Americans, and
when we said yes, the whole group began cheering and applauding us,
clapping their hands as if they were at a performance in a theatre. Not long
afterward, in the traffic circle in front of the hotel, a statue of Saddam Hussein
was pulled down by soldiers in an armoured personnel carrier.’
JUDITH MILLER AND THE WMD FAIRY — A PLANTED STORY?
AN ARTICLE appeared in The New York Times on April 21 by Judith Miller,
a journalist who once sold a book about how bad Saddam was in bulk to the
Kuwaiti Government. Miller’s report, published in The New Zealand Herald
(and hundreds if not thousands of other newspapers worldwide) studiously
avoided claiming the existence of any actual WMD evidence, and contained
enough disclaimers to make you wonder why it had been published it all. Yet
it still managed to make enough wiggle room for President Bush to claim two
days later: ‘Iraqis with first-hand knowledge of these programmes, including
several top officials who have come forward recently — some voluntarily —
(laughter) — others not — (laughter) — are beginning to cooperate, are
beginning to let us know what the facts were on the ground. ... it’s going to take
time to find them. But we know he had them. And whether he destroyed them,
moved them, or hid them, we’re going to find out the truth.’
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for reporters in Iraq to be accredited and embedded — and to consent to US
Government censorship.
On March 10 — before the war began —  Kate Adie, a senior BBC war
correspondent, told Irish national radio broadcaster Tom McGurk. ‘ I was told
by a senior officer in the Pentagon, that if  uplinks —that is the television signals
out of ... Baghdad, for example— were detected by any planes ... electronic
media... mediums, of the military above Baghdad ... they’d be fired down on.
Even if they were journalists ...’
On April 10, after the most egregious examples of journalist targeting,
FAIR issued an advisory, IS KILLING PART OF PENTAGON PRESS POLICY?
This said:
 On April 8 ... US military forces launched what appeared to be deliberate
attacks on independent journalists covering the war, killing three and
injuring four others. In one incident, a US tank fired an explosive shell at
the Palestine Hotel, where most non-embedded international reporters in
Baghdad are based. Earlier in the day, the US launched separate but near-
simultaneous attacks on the Baghdad offices of al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi
TV. Both outlets had informed the Pentagon of their exact locations.
Alastair Thompson is editor of the independent New Zealand website Scoop.
This is an abridged version of his public address entitled ‘The role of media in
the Second Gulf War’ at St Andrew’s On The Terrace, Wellington, on 29 April
2003. Links to online media sources for this article can be found at the full
address: www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0304/S00223.htm
